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The limitations of my paper In order to stay within the scope of my paper, I will focus on the reporting in the initial phases  (characterised  by  silence  or  censorship),  the  breakthroughs  (when  official information  is  released)  and  the  first  days  after  the breakthroughs.  Such  an  approach will be instrumental in observing the relationship between openness and censorship in a crucial phase. The papers  I have  taken my material  from,  the Renmin Ribao and the Nanfang  Zhoumo,  are  not  chosen  to  reflect  the  general  picture  of  how Chinese media covered  these events, but  rather  they serve as  two extremes on a continuum between strictly official and more liberal papers.  I believe that comparing these newspapers will be useful in observing the limits on  public  discourse  as  well  as  the  relationship  between  the  official  and more  liberal discourse. On sensitive issues, the Renmin Ribao together with the official news agency Xinhua set  the standard for how to report within the  limits of censorship.  In  the same cases,  the Nanfang Zhoumo and other more  liberal publications use clever methods  to push the limits.   
Theory 




centuries to come due to capitalist hegemony over labour and mass media’s submission to private or state privileged interest.6 Newspapers were  attributed  a  special  role  in  stimulating  the  emergence  of  the public  sphere  in  the  late  seventeenth century. At  this  time,  critical  journals and moral weeklies, increasingly concerned with issues of general social and political significance, emerged  parallel  to  the  saloons  and  provided  a  new  forum  for  the  conduct  of  public debate.7 In  the  social‐democratic  welfare  state,  however,  Habermas  argues  that  the newspapers  have  been  given  institutional  guarantees  and  thereby  moved  into  the political  sphere  of  the  state.  At  the  same  time,  private  interest,  organised  in  interest organisations  and  political  parties,  has  moved  into  the  public  sphere,  where  these interests  are  put  to  the  fore  through  the work  of  professional  public  relation  officers. The  result  is  a  “re‐feudalisation  of  the  public  sphere,”  a  situation  characterised  by display of private interest before a mass audience more or less interested in politics. Habermas’s theory has been described as groundbreaking and been influential in the  study  of  civic  life.  It  has  nevertheless  met  much  critique,  among  others,  from Schudson.  He  finds  it  “profoundly  ahistorical  and  entirely  insensitive  to  the  ways  in which  intellectual  and moral  ideals  of  public  life  have  themselves  shifted  over  time.”8 Schudson argues  that  such a public  sphere never existed  in  the U.S., which has  rather been  going  through  periods  of  trust‐based,  party‐based  and  rights‐based  models  of citizenship. John B. Thompson has also directed important critique to Habermas’s theory. He claims  it neglects  the role of popular social movements of  the period,  that  it has a  too selective description of  the  character of  the printed press and  that  it  fails  to  take  into account  the  implications  of  the  restricted  access  to  the  public  sphere  for women  and peasants9.  Of  special  interest  here,  is  his  questioning  of  Habermas’s  conception  of publicness and  its normative  implications. Thompson explains how  the  ideal  situation where  reason  rules  through  an  inclusive  open  debate  is  based  on  the  idea  that “individuals come together in a shared locale to engage in dialogue with one another as equal  participants  in  a  face‐to‐face  conversation.”  He  points  to  how  it  would  be practically  impossible  today,  in  a world where  actions may  affect  individuals who are widely  dispersed  in  space  and  time,  to  carry  out  a  debate  where  all  affected  could                                                         
6 Habermas 1989. 7 Thompson 1995 8 Schudson 1999:3 9 Thompson 1995:71‐75 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participate. “Millions would be reduced to silence while others spoke in their name, and the concerns of future generations would find no place on the agenda of the living,” he says,  referring  to  the  need  for  governments  and  international  bodies  to  come  to decisions on global issues such as environmental protection. Thompson concludes that “we must  seek  to  develop  a way  of  thinking  about moral‐practical  issues which  does justice  to  the  new  and  historically  unprecedented  circumstances  under  which  these issues arise today.”10   Having  raised  these  important  questions  about  Habermas’s  concept,  I nevertheless register how the critics successfully use it as a reference point in order to describe the current condition, as I will do here. Raymond Kuhn defines “public sphere” as an “institutional framework and set of practices which encourage wide and inclusive public  debate  about  issues  of  social  and  political  importance.”11 I  find  this  approach comprehensive, and will use this understanding of Habermas’s theory in this paper. The fruitfulness of using the concept of a public sphere as an analytical tool when studying  China  has  also  been  questioned,  among  others  by  Philip  Huang.  On  the background of China’s specific history of socio‐political organisation, he argues  for  the need to “break out of the old conceptual habits of postulating a simple binary opposition between state and society” by studying what he calls the “third realm.”12 The third realm consists  of  entities  that  grew  out  of  the  state‐imposed  organisation  of  society  into segmented  communes/brigades  in  agricultural  areas  and work units  (danwei 单位)  in the cities. Those were “tightly knit within themselves, but  largely segmented from one another.”1314  Here, he argues, the state joins with society for public activities beyond the capacity of the formal bureaucratic apparatus. With a history of over four decades, these entities have operational logics on their own that are “distinct both from state agencies and private associations.”15   While  acknowledging  the  value  of  studying  the  processes  within  such  a  third realm specific to the Chinese historical experience, I nevertheless think that there is no need to take off the “glasses” of Habermas and his public sphere to be able to do so.                                                         
10 Ibid 1995:263 11 Kuhn in Randall 1998:24. 12 Huang 1993. 13 Ibid 1993:237. 14 Perry and Lü (1997) have noted the “cellular” nature of the urban work units in the Mao‐state. The danwei was utilised for political mobilisation, but also provided its workers with social benefits, such as housing, medical care and canteens. Bjorklund explains how the very physical construction of the danweis, with walls around them and buildings facing inwards, excludes outsiders and “at the same time provides a basis for integrating those within it into an effective social, economic and political unit.” (Bjorklund in Perry and Lü 1997) 15 Huang 1993:238. 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Barret McCormick and Liu Qing point to the contradiction in Habermas’s theory that  on  the  one  hand,  he  says  the  public  sphere  is  a  “historical  category,”  but  on  the other hand, he uses  it  as a  “normative  concept  to express  ideals of openness,  equality and reasoned debate.” They argue that Habermas himself opened for a wider usage and that  it  empirically  speaking  could  be  several  public  spheres,  among  them  which  the “liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere” is relatively close to the ideal type.16 Facing  the  critics, McCormick  and  Liu  first  argue  that Habermas’s  ideas  are  no less  problematic  when  empirically  applied  to  the  West  than  to  China,  as  his  claim regarding the development of a public sphere in early modern Europe has not withstood empirical  scrutiny.  Secondly,  they  remark  that  as  no  society  has  reached  Habermas’s ideal  public  sphere,  it  would  be  “orientalist”  to  claim  that  values  such  as  open  and reasoned debate are essential characteristics to Western societies, but not to the East17. Applying  this  approach  to Habermas’s  theory,  I  believe  it  is possible  to use  the public sphere as both an empirical and normative analytical tool when studying China. One might empirically study the institutions and other spaces where a public debate is carried out. Doing that, factors such as legal framework of the press, degrees of editorial independence, censorship, the degree of access to the debate and which topics are being discussed will be useful measures to consider, as I will do here.    The  idea  that  Habermas’s  liberal  public  sphere  embodies  remains  central  to democratic  theory.18 When  discussing  China  using  Habermas’s  concept,  many  have sought to consider the political implications changes in the public sphere might have for a democratic transformation in the country. This will not be the main focus in this paper, although I will comment upon it in my concluding notes.     




Who has a say? A quantitative and qualitative inquiry  With a theoretical base in the Habermasian theory of the public sphere, I have chosen to put a special attention to inclusiveness to the discourse and to what topics are brought into  the  spotlight. When  I  read  the  articles,  I  counted  and  registered  the  sources  the papers had used (See table 1 and 2). The question of whose voices a paper chose to carry in its columns is crucial to understand the editorial policy of the paper and the nature of censorship.  Yuezhi  Zhao  has  noted  the  lack  of  voice  by  several  groups  of  people  in  the Chinese  news  media.  In  her  study  of  the  media  discourse  about  China’s  WTO membership,  she  finds  that  in  spite  of  the  impact  a membership would  have  on  their lives, neither a single worker nor a farmer was interviewed in the entire coverage.20 A muted group is of course a strong indication of an unequal power relation. At the same time, the groups who do get to speak are not necessarily powerful just because they are given access to the discourse. Interviews and other texts are edited according to what the journalists and editors want for the final story and to the formal and informal rules of reporting. As a result, arguments can be broken up or taken out of context and important aspects can be omitted. A participant in the debate may also speak the case of another person or group. For example, a journalist may speak the case of the consumers. These  variations  will  not  be  reflected  in  my  numbers  and  will  therefore  be  given additional attention in the analyses of the texts.21 




In  other  words,  CDA  aims  to  investigate  critically  social  inequality  as  it  is  expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse.)22  A good example of a study with a CDA approach  is  found in Yew‐Jin Fang’s analysis of how official newspapers on Mainland China (the People’s Daily) and Taiwan (the Central Daily News) covered social unrest  in South Africa and Argentina at the middle and the end of the 1980s.  In her analysis, Fang examines the main lexical choices the journalists had made when writing about the events. She then looks at the choice of headlines and themes in order  to  see  what  topics  the  paper  had  prioritised.  Next,  she  looks  at  actor  roles, quotations and news sources and  finally she carries out a grammatical analysis with a focus on transitivity. The latter shows how the roles of different participants are being downplayed or highlighted in any given situation.  Parallel to the detailed analysis of language, she considers the relations between her findings in the texts and the larger socio‐political context of the day. In the beginning of her paper, she explains that in the 1980s, the ruling regimes in the PRC and the ROC both strived for greater diplomatic recognition as the legitimate Chinese government by the international community. The white South African government maintained friendly diplomatic relations with the ROC government, but not with the PRC government. In her case study of the South African civil unrest in March 1985, Fang finds that the  journalists’  choice  of  words,  headlines,  themes,  sources  and  grammar  to  a  large extent serve to support their respective regimes political needs of the day. For example, the People’s Daily mostly used anti‐apartheid sources whereas  the Central Daily News gave a strong voice to the South African government and police sources. Looking at the grammar, she found that the People’s Daily made extensive use of transitive sentences to highlight the active role of the police in the killings of the demonstrators.  When  turning  to  the  case  of  Argentina  and  the  spring  of  1989,  however,  she notifies the convergence in presentation of the event in the two papers, something she attests to a different diplomatic climate and thus different needs of the leaders.  In this paper, I will follow a CDA‐approach where I critically consider my material in light of the socio‐political context, as in the example above. As my main focus is on the different phases of reporting, I chose to follow the timeline of the coverage closely and include all published material, rather than analysing a few articles in great detail.                                                          
22 Wodak and Meyer 2009:10 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Regional perspective To provide for a regional comparative perspective, I will look shortly at my two cases in the light of how a similar national crisis in South Korea was covered by the media there. I  have  chosen  to  look  at  the  case  of  the  once  internationally  recognised  stem  cell scientist  Hwang  Woo‐suk,  who  was  accused  of  having  broken  international  research ethics and later of having fabricated data for his research. I will not go into depth on this case;  my  aim  is  rather  to  show  what  implications  a  similar  event  had  on  the  public sphere in another East‐Asian country with a different media system.  
Background 
Chinese media today: new powers, control and commercialism Through  the  overshadowing  authority  of  the  Party’s  Propaganda  Department,  the Communist  Party  of  China  (CPC)  still  has  control  over  the  media,  both  in  terms  of ownership and content. But,  there have been significant changes  in  the Chinese media landscape during the past 30 years, and most media enterprises have been thrown into the  market  to  become  profit‐making  actors.  As  a  result,  consumers  have  gotten considerable influence over the way the media develops. In order to sell their products, media  houses  have  reoriented  to  include  profit making  as  one  of  their  organisational goals.23 One result of this is that a liberalisation in terms of topics has taken place, and many have discussed  the political  implications of discourses  that  carry values  such as individualism,  consumerism  and  scepticism  of  authority  being  articulated  in  music television, soap operas and weekend consumer reports.24    McCormick  and  Liu  argue  that  even  though  this  commercial  culture  is  often apolitical,  it “may nonetheless undermine the traditional relationship between political authorities  and  the  public. 25  Others  have  claimed  that  in  a  Chinese  context, commercialisation  has  led  to  a more  open  debate  through  a  focus  on  individuals  and things  that  are  relevant  to  their  lives.  Hallain  says  the  fact  that  the  experience  of ordinary  people  is  increasingly  the  prime  source  of  evidence  and  value  in  the  news would  seem  to  be  an  “important  symbol  of  a  shift  towards  a  democratic  political culture.”26 Yuezhi Zhao has observed how this trend influences the reporting of scandals,                                                         
23 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:22. 24 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:31. 25 McCormick and Liu in Lee 2003:139. 26 Hallain in McCormick and Liu in Lee 2003:154. 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saying that “there is considerable market for scandals, but scandals are far more likely to be presented in terms of an individual with moral problems than a systemic failure.”27 The opening up policy and the strong focus of economic progress has made the economic elite and the middle class new powers  in the Chinese society.28 This has had its impact on media as well as most other aspects of Chinese society. Yuezhi Zhao sums up this transformation: The Chinese media system is  increasingly becoming a platform for profit making while speaking in the voice of the ruling Party elite and the rising business and urban middle classes who are the domestic and international capital most wanted audiences.29 She notes  how  the publishing  of  a  successful  business  story  simultaneously  is  a  story about the success of the Party’s economic reform program and its ideology for openness. She  further  argues  that  what  may  seem  to  be  a  paradox  in  the  new  Chinese  media system – persistence of control in the political domain and liberalisation in the economic and lifestyle spheres – may as well be considered two sides of the same coin that serves the interest of the political and economic elite.30  










voices  in  the  public  sphere.40 She  shows  how  journalists  write  in  system  critique between the lines, for example how one journalist showed the failure of the government to control an illegal blood business that escalated the AIDS epidemic through telling the tragic personal story of an AIDS victim.41 Another development  that has  reshaped  journalistic  culture and  the  role of  the journalist is the moving away from strictly fixed salaries from the government. From the 1990s,  bonuses  were  regularised  as  ”flexible  wages”  and  distributed  on  basis  of individual  merit  instead  of  political  commitment  and  seniority  as  earlier  practised.42 Economic  incentives  in  form of story  fees or good story cash awards has, according to Eric Kit‐wai Ma, led to more aggressive journalists.43   On the other hand, in the wake of marketisation, journalists all of a sudden found themselves  in  the prime nexus of exchange, where both public and commercial bodies paid  them  for political  and economical  favours.44 Commercialisation of Chinese media, Ma sums up, involves highly manipulative relations between political powers, economic interests  and  pay  journalism,  which  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  a  romanticised  view  of  a democratic marketplace of ideas.45  
The role of globalisation and the Internet Some  have  argued  that  Internet  technology  dooms  authoritarian  governments  by  its very  nature.46 So  far,  this  has  not  been  the  case  in  China,  although  considerable resources are used  to control  the  Internet. Apart  from more  traditional  techniques  for regulating the media, above all, the authorities work to maintain an atmosphere of surveillance and implicit and explicit threats  where  those  who  work  in  the  media  will  censor  themselves  rather  than  risk incurring unwanted official attention and punitive action.47 The Internet has nevertheless changed the way information circulates in society, and it can be argued that it provides for a more open and meaningful debate on several fields. McCormick  and  Liu  have  shown  how  the  Internet  quickly  started  to  influence official  discourse  in  China,  even  the  Renmin  Ribao.  An  explosion  in  a  schoolhouse  in                                                         
40 Sæther 2008:4. 41 Sæther 2008: “Medias politiske rolle i Kina” (Radio lecture at P2‐akademiet, Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK)). 42 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:22. 43 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:23. 44 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:23. 45 Ma in Curran and Park (eds.) 2000:26. 46 McCormick and Liu in Lee 2003:142. 47 McCormick and Liu in Lee (ed.) 2003:145.
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Wanhai County in rural Jiangxi province in 2001 killed at least forty people. The official press  early  blamed  an  unknown  man  described  by  villagers  as  psychotic,  that  had allegedly come to the school with fireworks, fired it up, and left a suicide note. The scene was  soon  closed  off,  but  a  Hong  Kong  reporter managed  to  interview  local  residents using a local accent. He found out that due to poverty and corruption of local leaders, the villagers had been pressed  to do dangerous work with  fire works on an assembly  line and that the explosives were stored at the school. The story spread through the Internet to Mainland China media, and even the Renmin Ribao reported on the new information in its online version.48 After this information came out, then premier Zhu Rongji made an apology to the NPC,  saying  that  the  government would work  to  enforce  rules  that would  avoid  such tragedies in the future. This example shows how globalisation and new technology can influence policy and lead to at least a limited degree of accountability.  The example also serves to show that already by 2001, before the SARS outbreak, the influence of the Internet was visible in the Chinese media landscape. In 2001, China only had 26 million Internet users. Today it has 420 millions49, and social media, such as blogs  and  chat  rooms,  has  also  made  regular  Chinese  able  to  spread  their  own information about cases. Xiao Qiang argues that “the rise of online public opinion shows that the CPC and government can no longer maintain absolute control of the mass media and information.”50 According to him the result is a power shift in Chinese society. 
Official and unofficial ideologies – “scientific development” and nationalism  After Hu Jintao was inaugurated as President of the PRC on March 15th 2003, the concept of  “scientific  development,”  (kexue  fazhan  guan 科学发展观,)  together  with  that  of building a “harmonious society,” (hexie shehui 和谐社会,) soon became catchphrases for his  leadership  that  signalled  changes  in  policy  from  the  former  generation  of  leaders. Saich  explains  the  new  development  strategy  as  one  that  “combine  populist authoritarianism in the political realm with a shift in economic policy that focus more on the sustainability and quality of economic growth rather than its speed.”51 Parallel to his commitment to people and regions that had been left behind by economic reform, Saich notes that Hu from the beginning opted for a firmer grip on the public sphere. “In place                                                         
48 McCormick and Liu in Lee (ed.) 2003:140ff. 49 中国互联网络信息中心 China Internet Network Information Centre’s webpages. 50 Xiao Qiang in Shirk 2011:15 51 Saich 2006:41. 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of  any  significant  reform,  President  Hu  is  offering  cleaner  and  more  efficient government  administration,”52 he  says  in  a  summary  written  in  2005,  the  year  Hu  is believed  to  have  fully  consolidated  his  power.  Discussing  the  development  of  “Hu thought,” Joseph Fewsmith claims that the first use of the phrase “scientific development concept” appears to have been by Hu Jintao during an inspection trip to Jiangxi Province in September 2003.53 In light of this, it is interesting to see how the word “scientific” was used in a broader sense than the conventional meaning of the word already during the SARS  outbreak  in  spring  the  same  year  in  my  material.  McGee  called  those  broad political terms ideographs: An ideograph is an ordinary‐language term found in political discourse. It is a high order abstraction  representing  commitment  to  a  particular  but  equivocal  and  ill‐defined normative goal.54  These potent terms, even though unclear, are used precisely to give the sense of a clearly understood  and  shared  meaning.  “Scientific  development”  and  “Harmonious  society” may be  considered  such  ideographs  and  it  is  therefore needed  to  critically  study how they are filled with meaning in particular contexts. To understand media policy in China, it is necessary to understand the challenge posed by  the demise of  communism. The  ideology  that brought  the CPC  to power has lost  its relevance, and the question of how to maintain legitimacy is a complicated and urgent one. Zhou He has remarked that the Chinese Communist state, which has turned itself into a bureaucratic capitalist system, is “endeavouring to work out how to fit into the  global  system  and  legitimise  its  mandate  to  rule  derived  from  a  Communist revolution  that  has  lost  its  popular  following.”55 Nationalism  has  been  one  of  the answers to this challenge. But rather than a new moral banner, the patriotic sentiment of nationalism has been an:  effective glue to an otherwise fragmented nation and an emotion that could be cunningly manipulated to serve state power, thus becoming a catch‐all ideological artefact for most of the spiritual discourse in the country.56 To evoke sentiments of nationalism, it is often referred to how China has been wronged by colonial powers in the past, especially during the Opium Wars, or to China’s history                                                         
52 Saich 2006:41. 53 Fewsmith 2004. 54 McGee 1980. 55 He in Lee (ed.) 2003:196. 56 He in Lee (ed.) 2003:211. 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as one of  the world’s most powerful nations and  its  intentions  to return  to  its  rightful position  as  a  super  power  and  a  full  and  equal  member  of  the  international community.57 The  balancing  between  official  and  popular  nationalism  has  become  a challenge  to  the  Party  in  the  governing  of media,  and  it  strives  not  only  to  uphold  a patriotic  sentiment,  but  also  to  keep  it  from  growing  out  of  hand,  putting  China’s international reputation at risk.58 Feeding  the  nationalist  sentiment  among  people  has  indeed  also  proved necessary  in order  to uphold  the  legitimacy of  the CPC at home. When President  Jiang Zemin released the twenty‐four crewmembers of the U.S. spy plane that collided with a Chinese  fighter  in  2001,  many  self‐proclaimed  nationalists  accused  him  of  being  too soft59.  Suisheng Zhao has noted  one Western  reporter’s  observation  that  “for  the  first time since  the Communist Party  took over  in 1949,  the rulers  in Beijing were accused not of corruption or totalitarianism, but of treason.”60  




democratic reforms or giving up power.”63 In autumn 2008, China was going to carry out one of its greatest national prestige projects – the Beijing Olympics. Patricia M. Thornton argues in her article “SARS and the Resilience of the Chinese Body Politic”  that  “crisis  itself may have emerged as a mode of governance  in  its own right  during  the  post‐revolutionary  era.”64 She  notes  how  the  rhetoric  of  crisis  may indeed “improve the speed and scope of policy implementation and reduce the ‘central‐field’ gap in the short term” and that  it bears notice that crises are themselves discursively constructed by leaders, who frame them  in  a  manner  conductive  to  their  particularistic  interests  and  needs  and  in accordance with their perceptions.65  In other words, to define a situation as a “national crisis,” like we will see was done quite clearly in both the following examples, may help implement policies that are unpopular on a local level by creating an atmosphere of national interest. 




and Cristof  say  that  ”In a  fully  commercial market,  the People’s Daily, China’s  flagship newspaper, would likely vanish without trace, so great are its credibility problems.”67 Eric Kit‐wai Ma notes that the base readers of official papers to a large extent are offices where  it  is  considered  politically  correct  to  read  such  papers, whereas  people would read mass appeal papers at home.68 




Analysis Having painted a back drop of the historical and present situation of media and the role of the journalist in China as well as some of the current political ideologies, I will now go through  the  main  findings  from  my  material  and  discuss  them  underway  with references to my background topics and to other relevant writings.  






Business as usual, but need to upgrade the system When it started its intense reporting in early April, the Renmin Ribao painted a picture of a situation under control and of “business as usual” for tourists and companies. In a story based on the April 3rd press conference at the MOH, the Minister of Health, Zhang Wenkang, assured that it was safe to travel in China, he even encouraged people to come, and informed that the WHO had declared Beijing not to be an epidemic area anymore.81 The next  day  the  deputy  director  of  the Tourist  Bureau,  Sun Gang,  assured  through  a press release that ”China is still the most fertile land to invest in and the safest place to travel.”82 Two weeks  later,  on  April  18th,  the  Tourist  Bureau  and  the MOH  sent  out  a detailed plan to the whole sector on how to take the necessary precautions. It is likely that the government at this point was still struggling to get a grasp of the situation and  that  the approach  taken at  this  first press conference was  to control information in order to calm people down and avoid panic. To protect the economy and the climate for foreign investments might also have been crucial, considering the strong focus  on  economic  growth  and  the  close  ties  between  the  government  and  business owners.  At  the  same  time,  it  became  obvious  that  the  government  was  working intensively to solve the problems around the outbreak, and it quickly became clear that the  system  in place had  severe  flaws.  In  this  first phase,  the most  critical  voice  in  the discourse was Wu Yi, vice‐premier of the State Council. Visiting the CDC for an informal discussion  about  strengthening  the  system  to  handle  sudden  public  health  cases,  she underscored  the need  to build and  improve  the system of  responding  to and handling sudden public health cases, “especially the information system within public health and the system of warning and reporting.”83  







mid  February,  the  government  had  acted  in  time.  ”After  that,  my  nation  timely announced the national situation, and from April 1st it reported daily to the WHO about the epidemic situation,”84 a  journalist  said when evaluating  the government’s handling of the situation. The consequences of SARS being sorted under criminal  law were discussed and explained by one of the paper’s journalist in a conversation with a legal expert on April 23rd.  Here,  the  responsibility  of  both  the  government  and  of  regular  people  were outlined,  but  even  though  the  law,  which was  quoted  in  the  article,  to  a  large  extent focused on the government’s rights and responsibilities, the main focus in the journalists and the law experts’ comments were on the citizens responsibilities.85  
WHO as a source From April 1st, China started to report daily to the WHO. On April 3rd, the first delegation of  WHO  experts  arrived  at  Guangzhou  to  learn  about  the  situation,  and  the  Renmin Ribao followed the events  leaning mainly on official accounts. The Health Minister had been confident, however, when he answered a German journalist at the April 3rd press conference, that as soon as the WHO got to know the situation in Guangdong,  it would reconsider its stand that people should not travel to Hong Kong and South China. Although the WHO made up a not insignificant 7,8 per cent of the sources in the discourse, its positive comments about the good cooperation with the Chinese side and their contributions to the work of finding good ways to cure the disease were repeated several  times,  and  I  will  argue  that  they  had  a  limited  access  to  the  discourse, considering  their  central  role  in  coordinating  the work  of  stopping  the  epidemic.  The fact that WHO experts had been invited three times to come to China to cooperate with their experts served as a proof that China had been open about the case and that it had been sensitive to the WHO and the international community’s need for information. At the  same  time,  the  government  repeatedly  said  that  it  would  work  to  increase  the cooperation with the WHO.  



















cent of the paper’s SARS coverage, but because the questions were usually being refuted resolutely  or  turned  around  and  used  to  promote  patriotic  sentiments,  they  had  a limited influence in their own right on the discourse. 







people to make use of simple methods to avoid getting infected or spreading the disease; among other things they explained in detail how one should wash one’s hands99. On  the  organizational  level,  one  could  on  April  22nd  read  an  article  about  how a  ”model”  neighbourhood  in  Guangzhou,  with  a  concentrated  population  and  several SARS  cases,  had  overcome  fear  by  providing  tight  follow  up  by  doctors  and  by distribution of information in form of leaflets as well as community meetings100. Finally,  on  April  23rd,  a  lengthy  article  written  by  the  director  of  Beijing University of Public Health, Hu Yonghua, put SARS  into  the wider historical  context of infectious  diseases.  He  reminded  about  the  breakthroughs  of  scientists  the  last  100 years in making vaccinations and eliminating many of those diseases. With an optimistic flavour,  underlining  his  faith  in  the  ever  more  rapid  scientific  progress,  he  carefully explained how to fight a disease by using SARS as an example.101 The  format  of  the Renmin Ribao  seemed  suitable  for  broad  ”public  education,” and I regularly found articles with a question as a headline, such as ”Why do some SARS patients  die  at  once,  while  most  people  completely  recover?”102  In  these  articles, specialists  gave  answers  without  interruption  from  a  journalist  or  efforts  to  make  it tabloid.  







It was  interesting  to  see  how  the words  “science”  (kexue 科学)  and  “scientific” (kexuede 科学的,  kexuehua 科学化)  were  used  extensively,  both  by  journalists  and political  leaders, during  this period.  Science obviously played an  important  role  in  the handling of SARS, but when the word was used as an adjective or adverb, the meaning of it  became  less  clear,  and  it  started  to move  into  the  ideological‐political  realm  of  the ideograph. “Facing SARS, we should have a scientific, active attitude,”105 a commentary printed  on April  11th  started  out,  before  the  author went  on  to  calm down people  by saying that it was normal to catch the flu in springtime and that it was therefore no need to worry if one caught a cold. In another article, on April 24th, a commentator said, after having emphasised how SARS after all affect very few people: Seen  in  the  light  of  the  present  situation,  we must  scientifically  and  rationally  handle SARS  by minding  personal  health  care,  improve  immunity  and  do  all  in  our  power  to eliminate this infectious disease as soon as possible.106  The top leaders often said that the people and government alike should “rely on science” (yikao kexue 依靠科学) and that  if  they did there was no need to be afraid. A scientific attitude  seemed  to  be  something  that  everyone  could  have  and  to  be  the  best way  to meet  the  challenges  and  avoid  chaos.  It  seemed  to  mean  not  merely  the  opposite  of  “superstition” (mixin 迷信,) but rather all kinds of rumours that did not have an official stamp.  An  example  might  be  how  the  claim  in  some  foreign  papers  that  SARS  had originated in Guangdong was blown off as “unscientific” (bu kexuede 不科学的.) 
The health workers and the cadres – model workers and military references Most  of  the  news  articles  in  the Renmin Ribao were written  in  a  somewhat  technical language with  a  bureaucratic  tone.  I  found,  however,  that  the  discourse  of  the  health workers often came close to traditional Communist propaganda. The health workers relatively early became symbols of the struggle against SARS and they were portrayed as brave heroes or ”angels dressed in white” (baiyi tianshi 白衣






请战,) fighting on the ”battlefield” (zhan chang 战场) towards the “enemy” (di ren 敌人) of  SARS,  and  the  ultimate  goal was  ”victory”  (zhan  sheng 战胜,)  The  Party  committee secretary at the MOH’s Sino‐Japanese friendship hospital described his role as following:  To rescue the dying and support  the wounded  is a doctor’s bound duty,  it  is  just  like a solider  going  to war.  As  long  as  there  is  one  single  patient  that  is  still  not  saved  from danger, I cannot leave the front line.107 Cadres  were  often  portrayed  as  fighting  alongside  the  health  workers,  and  at  the hospital mentioned  above  they were  carrying  out  a  party‐activity when  the  journalist visited, where party members would do something practical to show their loyalty to ”the Party and the people.” Several nurses wore red badges with CPC logos on their uniforms. The director of the hospital said that many nurses had sent applications to become party members during the SARS struggle. The cadres were portrayed as ”taking the lead and making good examples” (shuaixian chuifan 率先垂范) through their work.108 The head of the hospital ended this article, saying ”If you compare the battle of the white soldiers to a forceful and roused symphony, then each party member provides a strong voice.”109  The overlapping roles of  the health workers and  the cadres and  the use of war metaphors  about  both  groups  connects  them  to  the Party  in  a way  that  talking  about their good deeds gives legitimacy and honour to the Party.  




Consumers  were  worried  and  unsatisfied,  she  concluded.  The  commentator  wrote that  ”these  ‘black  hearted’ managers  who  destroy  the  order  of  the market  should  be punished according to law and not at all in a soft hearted way.”110  On  April  23rd,  the  Renmin  Ribao  reported  that  the  National  Committee  for Development and Reform would carry out an inspection on prices of products related to preventing and curing SARS111. The same day, several departments and bureaus issued a notice urging people to read the instruction on Chinese medicine carefully and to avoid buying and consuming it if the product did not come with an instruction. It went on to tell in detail what a proper product instruction should contain. The notice read:  Lately,  some  elements  operating  outside  the  law  have  taken  advantage  of  the  label ‘preventing and curing SARS’ and produced and sold fake drugs, swindled for the sake of their own benefits and misled the consumers.112 It was  interesting to see that  the  field where discussion was most open  in the Renmin Ribao was  that  of  violations  against  consumers.  It  seemed  consumers  as  a  group  had been blessed with some degree of the same protection as the business leaders.  





big compared to just some days ago?” He pointed out three answers. The first was that there had been a sudden outbreak of a new illness and that it was a process to diagnose the  disease.  Secondly,  he  explained  that  the  system of  hospitals  in  Beijing, with  some hospitals  belonging  to  the  city  or  the  county,  some  to  the  MOH  and  the  Ministry  of Education and some to the Military and the armed police,114 ”lacks effective connections and  do  not  have  a  unified  leadership.  They  are mutually  unable  to  communicate  and resources  can  not  be  integrated.”115 The  result was  incorrect  data,  he  concluded.  As  a third point, he admitted that  the MOH had not been sufficiently prepared and that  the system  to  prevent  epidemics  was  weak.  Further,  they  had  failed  to  make  a  national unified system of collecting and reporting information after the outbreak, the demands had been unclear and the guidance not beneficial.116  In the following session, Gao Qiang answered journalists, most of them foreign, in a much more open manner than seen in the two proceeding press conferences. He did not  merely  make  repetitions  of  what  measures  the  government  had  taken,  he  also pointed directly to the weak parts and took responsibility for some of them. In his last address he said:  I do not support the saying that China is the safest place on earth and that you for sure will not  get  SARS  if  you  come here. But at  the  same  time,  I do not  support  saying  that China is a very dangerous country and that people merely by coming here will get ill.117  






of  Health  and  the  Beijing  municipality  government.” 119  Such  a  silence  among commentators about the reshuffle in the top leadership did not attest to a strong focus on  government  accountability  by  the  Renmin  Ribao,  at  least  not  in  this  first  phase  of reporting.  In  the  above‐mentioned  article, which was written  in  typical  propaganda  style, the phrase  ”new central  leadership group” was used  for  the  first  time  in my material. The article called SARS a “test” (kaoyan 考验) of the new leaders. It went on to describe how Hu Jintao had emerged at the frontline in Guangdong at the critical moment to see the health workers and praise their work. It also reminded about Wen Jiabao’s visits to the CDC, Beijing You'an Hospital, Beijing Normal middle school and kindergartens in the capital. It then recalled how the new State Council already had carried out three special meetings on SARS, how it had resolutely put SARS under legal regulation, how it made everyday reports to the WHO and to the public and  its decision to establish a national system to handle suddenly emerging public health cases.  In my material I found a picture of a new leadership deeply concerned about the situation and the people, with a strong sense of responsibility and a long list of changes that need to be made. It is worth considering the positive consequences the declaration of  a  crisis  may  have  had  for  the  new  leadership  in  its  ambition  to  carry  out administrative reform and consolidating its power.  
Nanfang Zhoumo reporting on SARS Turning to look at how the Nanfang Zhoumo covered the events in the spring of 2003, it becomes clear that it is quite a different kind of publication. The story reached the front page on February 13th, one day after the first article in the Renmin Ribao, and the whole front page and the second page was spent on SARS.  
A short glimpse of a Guangzhou on alert The  front‐page  article  was  headlined  “Guangzhou  is  struggling  against  an  unknown virus,”120 and had as many as 14 different  sources,  from mobile phone  firms  to online stock market  pages  to  pharmacy  employees.  In  the  story,  the  journalist  had  not  only interviewed many persons and found much information from different sources, but he had  also  been  to  several  places  himself  and  observed  the  situation.  For  example,  he described the smell of disinfectant in the neighbourhoods of the city, observed the long                                                         
119 Ibid. (Original text: “果断对卫生部和北京市政府主要负责同志的职务作出调整”) 120 Chen Min 陈海, Jiang Hua 江华: “Guangzhou is struggling against an unknown virus” “广州抗击不明病毒”, Nanfang Zhoumo February 13, 2003. 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lines in front of pharmacies (where the drugs believed to cure the flu were either sold out or the prices had soared) and noted that nurses and patients at the hospitals were wearing surgical masks.121 The story gave the reader a picture of the situation that the Renmin  Ribao  never  came  close  to  provide.  On  the  first  page  inside  the  paper,  a journalist had interviewed an expert from the CDC. Here, a strong focus was put on laws regulating sudden public health situations, such as division of responsibility, systems of reporting, isolation and closing of schools122. The expert did not give his name, and most of the sources in the stories this day were anonymous. I will return to the implications of this below. 
Hearsay to be fought with information At the bottom of the front page of this first publication covering SARS, one of the paper’s journalist  had  written  a  commentary  headlined  “Fear  stops  with  openness.”123  He pointed  at  how  it  was  wrong  to  blame  people  for  spreading  rumours  in  society because ”the contents of this so‐called hearsay is a matter of staying alive, and the right to life was early on universally acknowledged as the most fundamental human right.”124  In  the  whole  material  of  220  articles  from  the  Renmin  Ribao,  the  concept  of “human rights” was only used as a negatively loaded word in the dispute with Taiwan. “Human  rights” was not  a part of  the discourse about  SARS  in  the Renmin Ribao,  and when the Nanfang Zhoumo talked about it, it referred to the non‐controversial “right to life,” although it is linked to the right to information in a somewhat subtle way.  The  commentary  argued  that  people  in  the  whole  region  had  calmed  down during one evening after  they had  listened to  the  information about SARS given at  the press  conferences  of  the  Guangzhou  City  government  and  the  Guangdong  Province Health department on February 11th.  In the featuring news article on the front page,  it was  explained  how  rumours  of  a  “deadly  flu”  had  started  to  spread  in  Guangzhou through friends, family and the Internet on February 8th. Like the Renmin Ribao, the Nanfang Zhoumo commented on rumours spreading in  society  about  SARS.  But  the  discourses  in  the  two  papers  differed  fundamentally. When the Renmin Ribao talked about rumours, it focused on the “speculation” of foreign media  and  governments  or  the  “individual  acts”  of  scientists,  whereas  the  Nanfang                                                         
121 Ibid. 122 Wu Zhanguang 吴展光: “Interview with an expert at Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention – how to handle a huge， suddenly emerging public health crisis?” “国家疾病预防控制中心专家访谈 重大突发公共卫生事件如何处理?”, Nanfang Zhoumo, February 13, 2003. 123 Li Yiyan 李一言: “Fear stops with openness” “恐慌止于公开”, Nanfang Zhoumo, February 13, 2003. 124 Ibid. (Original text: “因为这里所谓的谣言的内容攸关生命，而生命权早已成为举世公认的最基本的，最首要的人权”) 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Zhoumo mainly  talked  about  regular  people’s  search  for  basic  information  on  how  to protect  themselves  against  the  disease.  This  demonstrates  the  bottom‐up  perspective Nanfang Zhoumo is said to represent.  
Negotiating the role of the media  In the “Fear stops with openness” commentary,  the  journalist moved on to discuss the role and mandate of the press to pass on important information to individuals. In light of the  change  in  people’s  lives  before  and  after  the  press  conference,  he  argued  that “people cannot but come to the conclusion that it is time to closely examine the role and function of the media.125” He explained the spread of rumours as caused by the lack of “the authoritative voice of the media and the government.” He then went on to remind of the  history  of  media  as  an  information  channel  between  people  and  between  the government  and  the  people.  But,  he  said  “for  a  long  time,  some  places,  some  officials have  ignored the role that media has  in substituting the people  in obtaining necessary information  and  in  spreading  it.”  He  argued  that  because  these  officials  had  been stopping  certain  information  from being passed on according  to  certain  “conventions” (guanli 惯例,) media were unable to carry out its role. We see here how the Nanfang Zhoumo were using the opportunity  to argue  for media’s role and agency by placing it in a domestic historical context. It did not directly refer to a “professionalism” ideal, but to something closer to a “Confusianist intellectual” ideal,  as described  in  the background  chapter. The key word was  “openness,”  and  the author actually went on to acknowledge the Guangdong Province government for having provided information about the disease “relatively timely” and thereby calmed down the public. “The reality proves that openness has not only not led to chaos (tianxia da luan 
天下大乱,) it has also rapidly calmed down the so‐called rumours.” This formulation can be  seen  as  a  critique  against  Communist  Party’s  traditional media  strategy  of  holding back information to avoid public unrest. 
Anonymous sources In  spite  of  their  claim  that  more  openness  in  information  would  fight  hearsay,  the Nanfang  Zhoumo  used  a  lot  of  anonymous  sources  in  their  first  stories  about  SARS. People from the government, hospitals, pharmacies or other media were quoted without being named. This attested both to the journalists and to the public’s awareness of the sensitivity of the situation, but at the same time it represented a credibility problem for                                                         
125 Ibid. 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the paper,  as  readers had no means  to check  the correctness of  its writings.  In  such a situation, the paper had to rely on peoples’ general trust towards it, but it also became vulnerable to accusations of spreading rumours itself.  




The challenge of the countryside and the voice of village people In the same April 24th issue, the paper’s journalists had visited several places in China, including  Shanghai  and Beijing,  the North‐eastern Ningxia  Province,  as well  as  a  poor village in Shanxi Province, to report on the local situations there.  The article from Ningxia shed light on the challenge to avoid the spread of SARS to the countryside. It told the story of a passenger who got sick more than ten days after having taken a train trip from Beijing to Inner Mongolia and how the effort to make sure the  disease  did  not  spread  further  had  been  carried  out,  after  much  discussion  and uncertainty about the consequences, by publishing the number of the carrier the patient had been on in local and national media.130  The story from Shanxi had a focus on common people’s knowledge about SARS. After having described that none of the people of all ages who stood around him wore surgical masks  and  that  there  had  been  no  smell  of  vinegar  (used  to  disinfect)  in  the village,  the  journalist noted  that  the village people actually did know the symptoms of the disease.131 One of the villagers pointed to the sky and stressed that the air was much cleaner than in the city. This was their “magic weapon” (fabao 法宝,) he said, referring to the by then common knowledge that circulation in air might help prevent the spread of SARS.  Having  learned  about  the  conditions  of  health  care  in  the  village,  however,  the journalist concluded  that  it was  their  “only magic weapon.” The nearest health station was  a  40‐minute  bike  ride  away,  and with  an  average  annual  salary  of  300  yuan,  the villagers did not have money  to buy herbal medicine or surgical masks, a government official informed. After having explained the shortcomings in the medical facilities on the countryside, where there was not a single breathing machine and isolation clothes had not yet arrived, the head of the Health Office in the county concluded that the effort had better be focused on avoiding a scenario where SARS spread to his county. As  in  the  first  issue,  it was highlighted  in many of  the articles  that even  though the situation had proven to be worse than first reported, people were calmed down by more accurate information. In the example from Ningxia, an official from the local health department said:                                                          
130 Lu Rong 卢嵘, Du Junxiao 杜峻晓: “Ningxia is trying to block “SARS”” “宁夏追堵”非典””, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003. 131 Wu Zhanguang 吴展光, Zheng Yigong (Shanxi Financial Daily) 郑亦工 (山西经济日报记者): “Xing county in Shanxi – a record from a poor county’s SARS struggle” “山西兴县 一个贫困县的抗非典纪录”, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003. 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The effects prove that reporting the case did not lead to unnecessary fear, but quite the opposite. Knowing the situation, people could understand the sense of responsibility of the government.132 At the same time, the reports from the countryside showed a situation of great concern and drew up the “worst case scenario” it would be if SARS got out of hand and spread to poor  areas.  Common  people  made  up  31,5  per  cent  of  the  sources  in  the  Nanfang Zhoumo’s coverage of SARS, making them a significant part of the discourse.  




public” (anding renxin 安定人心,) this method of ”indifference” (an zhi ruo su 安之若素) was not suitable. ”What kind of  humanitarianism (rendaozhuyi 人道主义) is that?”135 This  article  is  an  example of how  the Nanfang Zhoumo used  clever methods  to avoid  censorship  by  talking  between  the  lines.  Because  of  the  obvious  similarities between the Haicheng case and the SARS cover up and the use of the word “feidian”, the commentary actually did function as a critique against the system as well as against the government’s secrecy about SARS. 
The tainted milk scandal in the Renmin Ribao Five years after  the  last SARS patient had  recovered  in  June 2003,  the alarm  lamps  in Beijing once again started blinking – a little too late. This time, the central government was informed by the government of New Zealand that babies had fallen ill from drinking a baby milk formula produced by the Chinese owned company Sanlu. The New Zealand company Fonterra, that had a 43 per cent stake in Sanlu, had alerted its Chinese partner on August 2nd, but its request for an official recall had been refused. Fonterra then asked New Zealand to talk directly to Beijing, which it did three days later.  





Consumer information In this first phase, the paper had a focus on urging parents to report if their child showed symptoms of poisoning and that the financial government institutions would pay for the medical treatment.  On September 17th, the first results of the inspections were published in the form of lists – one list with the names of the 87 companies clean of tainted milk and one with the  22  companies where  inspectors  had  found melamine  in  products.  The  amount  of melamine in each product was also published. It was highlighted that no contaminated products  had  been  found  among milk  provided  to  the Olympics  and  the  Paralympics. Experts also underlined that melamine was an industrial chemical with a low degree of poison in it and that infants had to consume it in large quantities before they would get problems with the urine system. Most of  the affected could be cured by drinking  large amounts of water and urinate often, unnamed experts said.141 As it became clear that more and more people were affected by the scandal, the number of sickened infants became important and was reported daily.  







AQSIQ142 and  the Ministry of Commerce  received  the  report about  the Sanlu baby milk formula problem from the New Zealand side. Before this, the relevant local government had  already  handled  the  situation  concerned  and  implemented  measures.  After  the central  government  received  the  reports  from  the  local  governments,  the  emergency system was immediately activated and the related arrangements were made.143  Here, the spokeswoman actually avoided answering the question; she just said that the central government had acted right after it got the report from the local government. By  printing  the  question  of  “who  knew what when,”  the  paper  relatively  early addressed  the  issue  of  responsibility,  although  the  journalist  did  not  challenge  the spokeswoman’s  hazy  answer.  Typically,  a  Renmin  Ribao  journalist  would  ask  a government official questions that gave an opportunity to tell what the government had done and would do as well as to repeat the information it needed to give to the public. That being said,  in my material from the milk scandal more critical questions from the journalists were raised than during SARS.   Representatives  from  the  industry  were  given  column  space  to  put  several problems  on  the  agenda.  On  September  21st,  a  journalist  had  interviewed  dairy companies  and  in  one  article  he  asked  the  director  of  the  China  Dairy  Industry Association chairman, Liu Chengguo: “So, what do you think have to be done to promote a persistent healthy development of the dairy industry?”144 










room for ”National Inspection Exemption products”, he said that ”In fact,  the good and bad quality of products in the end can only be judged by the consumers. No product can rest on being chosen by an administrative organ or its agents.”149 He went on to say that the current situation, where indigenous brands are promoted without sufficient control, not  only  was  a  disadvantage  for  the  industry  and  people,  but  also  for  government credibility. The  next  day  yet  another  commentator  said  that  the  “National  Inspection Exemption products” system did not suit the current situation in China:  The problem is that under the condition of both a profit‐seeking principle and lack of a construction  for  social  trustworthiness,  the  corporation’s  self‐discipline  is  usually uncertain.150 Next, he  listed up  the problems connected  to  changing  the  system,  and his  conclusion was  that  the  new  ”Food  safety  law”  waiting  for  the  NPC  to  approve  it  was  a  huge challenge, but also an opportunity to improve legislation. 














first, to ask the relevant departments in the government to strictly investigate the quality of raw milk and to implement legal measures against the unlawful elements that added the  melamine  and  other  things  that  may  harm  the  quality.  Secondly,  we  asked  the government  to  strengthen  the  management,  control  and  coordination  of  the  media, create  a  favourable  climate  for  the  industry  in  their  recall  of  problematic  products  in order to avoid media hype and speculations about the case, that could create a string of negative impact on society.159 Wang  Jiangguo  said  that  it was  a  lack  of  ”sensitivity”  (minganxing 敏感性)  of  the  city government and their inability to raise the problem to an overall level that made them wait  until  September  9th  before  they  reported  the  situation  to  the  Hebei  province government.  He  admitted  that  their  trust  in  Sanlu  had  been  too  high  and  that  they should have questioned their credibility. In this article, the journalist was truly critical, something that also showed in his comments where he put weight on the facts about the scandal  that  were  unfavourable  to  the  Shijiazhuang  government.  Here,  the  very important  structural  problem  of  tight  relations  between  local  governments  and businesses was quite directly touched upon. 











The discourse of openness (公开) During  the  inspection  mentioned  above,  Wen  responded  to  the  lady’s  praise  of  the government’s recent openness by saying: “We have to be responsible to the people, so we must accurately publish (gongkai 公开) the situation to common people.”164 The  word  “gongkai”  was  by  2008  well  established  as  part  of  the  top  leaders’ vocabulary.  In  dictionaries  it  refers  to  several  adjectives,  such  as  “open,”  “overt,” “public,”  to  the  verbs  “publish,”  “make public,”  “make  known  to  the  public”  and  as  an adverb, to “openly”. The characters “gong” and “kai” translate as “public” and to “open.”  During SARS, we saw that the government turned around and started pursuing a more open line of  informing about the case. It did not, however,  in my material of 220 articles use the word “gongkai” about information to the public. In my 98 articles about the  tainted  milk  scandal,  the  word  was  used  10  times,  both  by  journalists  and  top leaders, usually connected to the word “transparency” (透明.)  Openness was also discussed using other  terms.  In a commentary published on September  22nd,  written  by  Renmin  Ribao's  Jiang  Hongbing,  headlined  ”Scientific development  is  of  utmost  urgency,”  the  author  says  that:  ”Having  gone  from  the common practise of former times of reporting only pleasant news to daring to not cover up every large and small scandal is a significant improvement.”165 Seen in light of the history of Chinese government’s media policy and the role of the  journalist,  this can easily be agreed upon.  In her commentary the main aim was to urge for a ”scientific development,” but she obviously saw openness of government as a prerequisite  for  that.  Still,  an  independent  role  of  the  journalist  or  the media was not taken into account in this kind of argument, and freedom of speech is not a topic.  In a  report  from Wen  Jiabao's visit  to  the U.S.  on September 24th,  his  “informal talk” with six Chinese  language news company’s chief editors  in New York was passed on  to  the  Renmin  Ribao's  readers.  The  editors  acknowledged  recent  government openness in information, the timeliness and transparency and Wen Jiabao answered:  When  it  comes  to  openness  in  information,  the  important  thing  is  openness  in government administration. The work of the government must be transparent, it must be carried out  in sunlight. Except  from responsibility,  service,  contribution and honesty, a government  should  not  have  any  other  special  powers.  In  the  end  we  support  two                                                         
164 Ibid. (Original text: “我们要对人民负责，就必须如实地把情况都向老百姓公开) 165 Jiang Hongbing 姜泓冰: “Scientific development is of utmost urgency” “科学发展迫在眉睫”, Renmin Ribao, September 22, 2008. (Original text: “从以往盛行的报喜不报忧，到敢于绝不隐瞒任何大灾小祸，已是不小的进步”) 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bottom of the same page, the paper printed a commentary headlined ”How to monitor the  safety  of  food  products.”167 The  commentary  focused  on  the  effectiveness  and functionality  of  the  American  monitoring  system  for  dairy  products  and  other  food products and the resulting high level of trust among American consumers towards these industries. It did not mention the tainted milk scandal or Sanlu, but was somehow linked to it by the time line next to it and of course the similarity in topic. It was obvious that the Nanfang Zhoumo saw its limitations in what it could write about the scandal without getting reprisals at this point. But again, we notice how it made an attempt to indirectly communicate its point of view and relevant information to its readers.  
Disciplining journalists In another commentary  in the September 18th  issue, one of  the paper’s commentators, Xiao Shu, criticised Chinese media under the headline “Countless public relations show the  degeneration  of  media.”168 He  refreshed  memory  by  telling  that  Sanlu  only  three years  ago  had  mysteriously  disappeared  from  a  list  made  by  some  media  of  dairy companies  connected  to  the  “Big  head  baby  scandal,”  where  babies  had  become malnutritioned after having being fed bad baby milk formula. “Seen in the light of this, what  really happened should not be hard  to  imagine,” Xiao Shu said, probably hinting that Sanlu had used its connections (guanxi 关系) to get off the list. He then went on to criticise  the unhealthy  conditions  in Chinese media,  saying  that media actually had  its share  of  responsibility  in  letting  the  Sanlu  case  happen,  because  it  followed  the “unspoken  rules”  (qian  guize 潜规则)  of  connections  and  pay  offs.  “The  media  must strive  to  break  loose  from  the  constraints  of  ‘unspoken  rules’  and  dare  to  report  the whole truth to the public,”169 he concluded in an attempt to discipline media itself. This again attests to the Nanfang Zhoumo's strong focus not only on the important role of the media, but also  its  responsibility. Without  criticising  the  censors,  it  encouraged media workers to be more daring and carry out their important responsibility. 




Zhangjiang  resigns,  one more  step  forward,”170 the paper  referred  retrospectively  to  a blog post where lawyer Zhou Ze had asked the AQSIQ director to resign two days before he did. He had argued in his blog that after an episode where melamine was found in pet food  exported  to  the  U.S.  in  March  2007,  the  AQSIQ  had  urgently  facilitated  sample testing of this chemical in other products, such as infant formula and liquid products, but nothing  had  been  found.  In  2008,  it  was  the  MOH  that  found  melamine  in  domestic products.  The  paper  said  that  “according  to  our  understanding,”  the  AQSIQ  after  this event put melamine on the list of what to test export products for. “The AQSIQ let go of a good opportunity here,”  the head of  the Agricultural University of China’s department for food studies commented, following up Zhou’s point. I  found  few  references  to  blog  posts  or  comments  posted  on  the  web  in  my material, but  I believe what  I  found may reflect  the  trend  to  some extent.  In my SARS material  in  Nanfang  Zhoumo's  first  issue,  it  was  said  that  people  were  getting information  from the  Internet about  the epidemic. Some web pages were also used as sources.  As  we  see,  during  the  tainted  milk  scandal,  the  Nanfang  Zhoumo  quoted  a lawyer who through his blog had raised critique against the control system for food. He was only one critical voice, but his role as a lawyer lent him some authority. In  the Renmin Ribao,  I  found one reference  to  the netizens, but  there  the voice was  that  of    “the  public”  used  in  a  way  not  too  different  from  how  the  Party  would traditionally talk about “the people,” the group it claims to represent.  
The storm of accountability (问责风暴)  In  the  above‐mentioned  story,  the  Nanfang  Zhoumo  looked  closer  at  the  role  and responsibility  of  the  resigned  director  of  the  AQSIQ.  The  story’s  under‐headline  read, “He was the spokesman for food safety in China. The department he led was 1.3 billion people’s assurance for safe  food. On September 22nd, he took the blame and resigned.” On his last press conference before that, he had assured that he would severely handle the people involved that had neglected their duty or acted against the law. At the same press  conference,  the  paper  continued,  he  was  asked  why  the  AQSIQ  had  not  found melamine in milk products earlier. The director answered that this chemical was not on any Chinese or international list of chemicals to test for in baby milk formula. This was questioned in lawyer Zhou Ze's blog, as outlined above. Further, the paper reported that already  by  June, worried  reports  from  a  parent  and  a  doctor  had  been  posted  to  the                                                         
170 Su Yongtong 苏永通, Ma Changbo 马昌博: “Li Zhangjiang resigns, one more step forward” “李长江辞职，下一步……”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 25, 2008. 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arguing  that  it  mainly  appealed  to  public  morale,  and  that  the  problem  was  a government run in an unhealthy way, rather than its individuals.   






The  volunteer  lawyers’  group  was  not  mentioned  in  the  Renmin  Ribao  in  my material,  although  it  may  have  appeared  later.  Lawyers  organising  outside  official control like this is a sensitive issue in China178. By informing about such a development, the Nanfang  Zhoumo provided  useful  information  to  the  people  despite  running  risks with the censors.  







The case of South Korea Having  examined  the  discourses  in  official  and  liberal  media  in  China  about  the  two biggest public health crises in the country in the reform period, I will turn briefly to look at how a similar national crisis was handled by media in South Korea in 2005–2006.  
South Korean media   Although  South  Korean media  structure  was  based  on Western models  and  theories, particularly  the  Anglo‐American  free  press model,182 Park Myung‐jin,  Kim  Chang‐nam and Sohn Byung‐woo show how the media industry in South Korea has developed under strong guidance of the state. From the 60s the media became an important tool for the government in its task of achieving rapid industrialisation and modernisation after the Korean War.  Media  therefore  owed much  of  its  growth  and  wealth  to  the  protective policies  and  preferential  treatment  from  government.  The  result  was  an  established media  with mainly  conservative  ideological  leanings  and  a  lack  of  diversity  in  public discourse.  In  recent  years,  however,  the  state’s power over media has decreased with the increasing dependency of media companies on income from advertisements.183   At the same time, the authors remark how the emergence of progressive media, such as the Hankyoreh daily, represented “evidence of democratisation taking place  in Korean society and changes in the power structure.”184 The Hankyoreh was established in 1988 by  journalists who had  lost  their  jobs  in  the  large conservative papers due  to their  roles  in  promoting  freedom  of  the  press  and  democracy  under  the  military dictatorship.  Unlike  most  Korean  papers,  that  are  owned  by  a  family  or  business conglomerate,  the owners of the Hankyoreh are 62,000 shareholders from all walks of life  in  Korea.185 In  the  example  below  we  will  see  how  a  TV‐program  aired  on  an independent  TV‐channel  sent  shock  waves  through  Korean  politicians,  scientists  and even rocked national identity.  




specific stem cells in the laboratory.186 The groundbreaking research, acknowledged by two  articles  in  Science,  a  renowned  international  science  journal,  could  someday  give insight into many hereditary conditions and even create replacement tissues genetically matched  to  patients.  For  these  achievements,  Hwang  gained  full  support  from  the government and, as we will see below, from a broad part of the Korean press and public. It was therefore a devastating blow to national pride when the investigative news program  PD  Notebook,  aired  by  Seoul‐based  Munhwa  Broadcasting  Corp.  (MBC),  on October 22nd reported that donors had been paid for eggs used in research, that junior lab members were among the donors and that Hwang had lied about the sources of the egg  cells  in  the  Science  paper.  This  was  regarded  as  a  violation  against  international research  ethics.  Two  days  later  Hwang  admitted  having  lied  about  the  sources  and resigned from a newly appointed director position at the Stem Cell Hub.  In  the  first  program  the MBC  did  not,  however,  reveal  that  they  had  evidence showing that the results of Hwang's research published in Science in 2005 was actually faked with the help of a manipulated photo. Misinformed by the journalists that Korean prosecutors  had  already  begun  an  investigation,  a  former  colleague  of  Hwang  had admitted the fraud and showed the reporters how he had manipulated the photos. The reporters secretly filmed the interview. On December 2nd, the top producers announced on a press conference that the report questioning the authenticity of Hwang's work was yet  to  come.  Realising  he  had  been  tricked  by  the  journalists  to  tell  his  story,  the whistleblower told another TV program that PD Notebook had coerced him into giving the info, thereby breaking professional journalistic ethics.  
Public outrage and ad pull outs Considered by many to be the world’s leading scientist in the field of stem cell research, Hwang had become a national hero and the audience supported him strongly even after he  had  admitted  his  violations  towards  research  ethics.  Over  20  000  comments were posted  on  the  MBC's  bulletin  boards  and  reporters  received  threats  from  Hwang‐supporters.187 Hundreds of women also volunteered to donate eggs for research. When 11  firms  pulled  advertising  from  the  news magazine,  the MBC  decided  not  to  air  the segment covering questions about the Science paper. Choon Key Chekar and Jenny Kitzinger have observed how Korean media in 2004 actively  promoted  a  nationalist  framing  of Hwang's work,  under  headlines  such  as  “A                                                         
186 Science website, January 2006: “How Young Korean Researchers Helped Unearth a Scandal ...” (news section). 187 News Guangdong, December 2, 2005: “Disgraced Stem Cell Pioneer Seen As a Hero”. 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great  Korean  achievement,”188 how  they  advocated more  financial  support  and  asked the  people  to  “render  its  unsparing  trust  and  support'  to  Hwang's  enterprise.”189 The authors  remark  that  “such was  the degree of  nationalistic  investment  in  the  stem  cell research enterprise that any critical questioning seemed unpatriotic.” The  quest  to  become  number  one  in  stem  cell  research  was  also  seen  as important  for  the  Korean  economy,  as  there  were  great  expectations  that  Hwang's discoveries could be commercialised resulting in a “bio‐medical boom.” This is also part of the explanation for the pro‐business conservative media’s approach. 
Conservative media’s reactions After  the  first  investigative  report  by  the  MBC,  conservative  media  showed  strong support  for  Hwang  and  spent  considerable  column  space  criticising  MBC  for  its aggressive reporting methods. When a  journalist  from the conservative Chosun  Ilbo, a newspaper described as “pro‐capital and right winged,”190 got an interview with Hwang after  he  had  escaped  publicity  in  December  2005,  he  described  the  professor  in  a sympathetic tone:  The familiar voice sounded faint over the cell phone on Monday morning, with a ring of weariness  from  too  much  happening  too  fast.  But  Prof.  Hwang  Woo‐suk  has  been through  much  in  recent  weeks:  he  has  been  hounded  by  investigative  reporters, apologized  for  ethical  lapses  as  he  pushed  ahead with  ground‐breaking  research,  and quit all his official posts.191 In many of its news stories, the wording portrayed the scientist as “clean” and the MBC's reporting methods as “dirty”:  Korea’s  broadcasting  watchdog  could  punish MBC's  investigative  program  “PD  Diary” over  alleged  strong‐arm  tactics  in digging  the dirt  on  cloning pioneer Hwang Woo‐suk and his team. Although the journalists’ methods were questionable, the impression was that national pride  and popular opinion  should go before  critical  investigation. President Roh Moo‐hyun showed his concern about the situation in a post on the official website: "Protest messages and phone calls can be made, but cancelling advertising showed things went too far and a social climate that does not tolerate criticism has been created."192                                                          
188 JoongAng Ilbo, February 13, 2004, in Chekar and Kitzinger 2007. 189 Korea Herald, February 16, 2004, in Chekar and Kitzinger 2007. 190 Chekar and Kitzinger 2007. 191 The Chosun Ilbo, December 5, 2005: “Cloning Pioneer ‘Just Wanted to Leave it All Behind’”. 192 News Guangdong, December 2, 2005: “Disgraced Stem Cell Pioneer Seen As a Hero”. 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On December 12th, SNU said it would start an investigation, and three days later the  MBC  broadcasted  the  interview  with  the  former  colleague  that  claimed  he  had doctored  the  photos.  On  December  29th,  the  university  determined  that  all  of  the  11 stem cell lines were fabricated.  In  the aftermath,  the discourse of national pride was  turned  into a discourse of national  shame and  trauma and  the virtues of  “Korean qualities”,  such as  “the hungry spirit”,  previously  praised  as  essential  to  Korean  achievements  and  manifested  in Hwang and his enterprise, were debated193. 
Market forces and nationalism In  Korea,  popular  outcry  and  a  powerful  conservative  pro‐business media  playing  on nationalist sentiments almost hindered serious research fraud from being brought into daylight. But when nationalist sentiments got out of hand, even the President, who had invested much confidence and money in Hwang, stepped forward to protect values of a healthy public debate. For the liberal Roh, with a background as a labour lawyer, it was probably a quite natural step to take after all. His tragic suicide in May 2009, a result of the  intense  pressure  the  incoming  government  of  Lee Myung‐bak  put  on  him  and  his supporters,194 may  serve  as  another  example  to  illustrate  the  difficulties  of  being  a liberal voice in a country where the conservative forces are as massive as in Korea. In  the  end,  the  independent  progressive  media  was  able  to  disclose  the hollowness of some of Korea’s “scientific achievements.” The fraud it uncovered was of a dimension neither the conservative media nor the government could afford to cover up.  
Concluding notes In  this  thesis,  I  have  examined how  two Chinese  newspapers  covered  the  two  largest public health crises  in  the reform‐era.  In a Habermasian spirit  I have tried to consider the  characteristics  and  the  condition  of  the  Chinese  public  sphere  by  looking  at  its institutional framework, the participants’ statuses, which topics were discussed and the inclusiveness  of  the debates.  I  have  also  closely  examined  the  language  in  the  articles and usage of particular terms. I  have  showed how  the  persistence  of  traditional  institutional  arrangements  of the media ensure that the party‐state still has much control of public discourse on topics                                                         
193 Chekar and Kitzinger 2007. 194 Suh 2010 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of  public  interest,  such  as  politics.  Yet,  market  reform  and  the  emergence  of investigating  journalism  in papers  such as Nanfang Zhoumo have  led  to a widening of the topics to be discussed within the limits of censorship. During the milk scandal, the official party paper Renmin Ribao aired more voices and discussed more topics with a wider sets of opinions than it did during SARS. Still, the extensive use of unchallenged  ideographs were serious hinders  for a rational debate.  I have  showed  how  the  word  ”science”  and  later  the  concept  ”scientific  development” were utilised  in  several ways  in  order  to  give  legitimacy  to  the Party  and  the  current leadership,  but  without  being  clearly  defined.  It  seems,  however,  that  pointing  out responsibilities  and  underlining measures  taken,  such  as  removing  people  from  their jobs or stripping them of party posts, were somewhat more acceptable in 2008. Both  in 2003 and 2008,  the consumers as a group got a special attention  in the Renmin  Ribao,  and  in  2008  violations  against  the  consumers  set  off  critique  towards several aspects of the current system by its commenting journalists. That being said, access to the debate in the Renmin Ribao was largely limited to official sources. I have shown how foreign governments and international organisations, such as the WHO, were quoted, but  in a strongly selective way. The same was true for foreign media,  which was  usually  brought  in  as  proof  either  of  hostile  foreign  actors attacking China or as supporting friends. Most of the nationalist sentiments I identified were propelled by articles in foreign media, including Taiwanese papers. In  the  Nanfang  Zhoumo,  a much wider  range  of  voices were  included,  such  as poor peasants  or  ”people  in  the  street.” The  journalists  themselves became  important witnesses through vivid reports based on their own observations in the field. Sensitive topics were discussed and new connections brought  into the light  in a critical manner. The paper was obviously restricted by censorship, but in restrictive periods it reported about  the  events  between  the  lines.  At  the  same  time,  the  Nanfang  Zhoumo  actively advocated for more government openness, a more responsible media and, although in a less direct manner, more freedom of the press. In Habermas’s  theory,  the  ideal  public  sphere  is  one where  citizens  are  able  to influence  rulers  through  the  power  of  the  best  argument.  The  extent  to  which  the debates  in  the Nanfang  Zhoumo  or  other  liberal  papers  are  able  to  do  this  is  hard  to measure.  I  have nevertheless  shown  that when  information  that might  hurt  the Party and its position were brought into the open it was hard for the Party to simply ignore it. 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At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  given  that  the  liberal  views  expressed  in  Nanfang Zhoumo  find  resonance with  the  population  at  large  and  their  perceptions  of what  is best  for  them  and  their  country.  Nationalism  and  patriotism  are  strongly  rooted sentiments that should not be ignored. Nor should the fact that journalists with a strictly “professionalist”  approach  to  their  role  belong  to  the  rarities,  even  though  an investigative  culture  has  emerged  in  some  papers  the  recent  years.  Not  only  is  their traditional  role  to support  the Party, most  journalists also belong  to  the urban middle class  that  has  gained  from  the  market  reforms  and  the  economical  growth  the  later years. This may serve as an additional explanation to why the Party still is able to mainly control the press through the most effective way – self‐censorship. So, what effect did those particular scandals and the reporting on them have on the climate of  the public sphere  in China? First,  I believe that SARS was a serious eye‐opener for the new leadership in Beijing, showing that its traditional approach to ”risk communication,”  that  put  political  stability  before  access  to  information,  no  longer served  the  Party’s  interest  as  well  as  it  had  during  the  Mao‐years.  By  declaring  a situation of crisis, however, the central  leadership were given the opportunity to more effectively  make  local  and  provincial  governments  implement  otherwise  unpopular policies.  Secondly,  the  tainted milk  scandal made  food  safety  into  a  politically  correct topic  to  discuss,  and  journalists were  given  the  task  to make  sure  similar  cases were revealed.  I  believe  this  is  closely  connected  to  the  fact  that  the  group  affected  by contaminated  food  are  not  just  ordinary  people,  but  also  consumers,  and  consumers have a special position in a society where the legitimacy of the ruling party largely rests upon  its ability  to sustain economic growth. Thirdly,  I have observed how a discourse of ”openness,” that was the domain of the Nanfang Zhoumo in 2008, had moved into the columns  of  Renmin  Ribao  and  into  the  speeches  of  the  top  leaders  in  Beijing. The ”openness” of  the official discourse did not, however, refer to any kind of political reform  in  the direction of a  free press or  freedom of expression, but  rather  to a more efficient government. In the sense that a  larger variety of topics have been opened for discussion and inquiry, the scandals can be said to have brought a strengthening of the public sphere in China.  At  the  same  time,  a more  proactive  and  humble  central  government  that  talks about openness and accountability may have strengthened the legitimacy and power of the Party, which do not have political reforms on its agenda for the time being. 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Category  Renmin  Per cent  Nanfang  Per cent          Central government (Wen Jiabao, State council, departments etc.)  70  20.2%  4  7.4% Local governments (province and city, incl. Hong Kong and Taiwan)  35  10.1%  7  13.0% Chinas president and Party leader, Hu Jintao, Politburo  7  2.0%  1  1.9% The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)  18  5.2%  1  1.9% Hospital administration/leadership  23  6.6%  4  7.4% Experts (scholars/psychologists/experts on Chinese medicine etc.)  20  5.8%  5  9.3% Medical doctors  12  3.5%  2  3.7% Nurses  13  3.8%     Recovered patients  11  3.2%     Patient's relatives  2  0.6%     Relatives of health personnel  5  1.4%     Common people/people on the street  4  1.2%  17  31.5% Chinese organisations  1  0.3%     Chinese companies  2  0.6%  4  7.4% Other Chinese medias  7  2.0%  4  7.4% World Health Organisation  27  7.8%  1  1.9% Foreign governments (incl. diplomatic envoys)  33  9.5%     Foreign companies  2  0.6%     Foreign organisations (incl. Hong Kong based)  4  1.2%     Foreign research institutes  4  1.2%     Foreign newspapers + foreign journalists questions at press conferences (incl. Hong Kong)  28  8.1%              Commentaries by the papers journalists (or articles with a strong commenting character)  14  4.0%  2  3.7% Commentaries from external actors (incl. Xinhua)  4  1.2%  2  3.7%          Total number of sources per paper/100%  346  100.0%  54  100.0%            Total  Per art.  Total  Per art. Total number of articles per paper/Number of 
sources per article:  220  1.57  16  3.38 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Table 2: Sources used in the two papers when covering the tainted milk scandal  
Category  Renmin  Per cent  Nanfang  Per cent          Central government (Wen Jiabao, State council, departments etc.)  46  32.6%  3  5.8% Local governments (province and city, incl. Hong Kong and Taiwan)  29  20.6%  1  1.9% AQSIQ  15  10.6%  5  9.6% Internal control actors  1  0.7%  1  1.9% Hospital administration/leadership  2  1.4%     Experts (scholars/psychologists/experts on Chinese medicine etc.)  7  5.0%  7  13.5% Lawyers      4  7.7% Health personnel  2  1.4%     Patient’s relatives  1  0.7%  1  1.9% Shop staff  2  1.4%     Common people, people on the street, customer  4  2.8%     Chinese organisations incl. interest groups and provisional associations   9  6.4%  9  17.3% Chinese companies, dairy producers, milk stations, dairy farmers  10  7.1%  11  21.2% Other Chinese medias  1  0.7%  2  3.8% World Health Organisation  1  0.7%     Foreign media (incl. Hong Kong)  1  0.7%              Commentaries by the papers journalists (or articles with a strong commenting character)  10  7.1%  7  13.5% Commentaries from external actors (incl. Xinhua)    1  1.9%          Total number of sources per paper/100%  141  100.0%  52  100.0%            Total  Per art.  Total  Per art. Total number of articles per paper/Number of 
sources per article:  98  1.44  18  2.89 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the WHO says the WHO’s stand on the Taiwan problem is completely clear” “世卫组织代表说, 世卫组织在台湾问题上的
立场一直是明确的”, Renmin Ribao, April 24, 2003.  
 Ren Guoping 任国平: “Speculations with evil intentions do not help the situation” “恶意
炒作  于事无补”, Renmin Ribao, April 17, 2003.   Xinhua in Renmin Ribao: “Mayors of three American cities went their “Chinatown’s” to dine” “美三城市市长到“唐人街”用餐”, April 18, 2003.   Bai Jian Feng 白剑峰: “How to treat atypical pneumonia – the Ministry of Health announces recommended method” “非典型肺炎如何治疗 卫生部公布推荐方案”, Renmin Ribao, April 7, 2003.  Zong Huanping 宗焕平, Wang Sihai 王思海: “More than 200 sickened has recovered and left hospital in Beijing and Hong Kong” “京港二百多位“非典”患者康复出院”, Renmin Ribao, April 14, 2003.   Yu Shujun 王淑军: “Specialists brief about preventing and curing of SARS – don’t misuse Chinese medicine, boil in a proper way” “专家提示预防非典—中药勿滥服 煎服应得法”, Renmin Ribao, April 18, 2003. 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Xu Jinzhang 胥金章, Huang Xianbin 黄献斌: “To guard against SARS one should follow the “four diligent” “防范非典要做到“四勤三好””, Renmin Ribao, April 19, 2003.  Liu Taishan 刘泰山, Mao Haowen 冒浩文: “How to effectively prevent SARS in the community?” “社区怎样有效防非典?”, Renmin Ribao, April 22, 2003.  Hu Yonghua 胡永华: “Humanity have the power to conquer all kinds of infectious diseases” “人类有能力征服各种传染病”, Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2003.  Zhu Yu 朱玉, Zhang Jingyong 张景勇: “Why do some SARS patients die at once, while most completely recover?” “为何有的非典患者很快死亡而大多数人能痊愈?”, Renmin Ribao, April 20, 2003.  Ministry of Health in Renmin Ribao: “The Ministry of Health request a strengthening of the organising of the research work to find the cause of SARS, scientists from around the world is intensifying its research on the cause of SARS” “卫生部要求加强非典型肺炎病
原学研究的管理，世界各国科学家正加紧研究非典型肺炎的病原”, April 14, 2003.  Liu Siyang 刘思扬: “When Hu Jintao was on an inspection trip to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences he encouraged the researchers to carry forward the spirit of patriotism and in a spirit of benefiting the people make use of scientific strength to win over SARS” “胡锦涛考察军事医学科学院和中科院时勉励科研
人员  发扬爱国奉献勇攀高峰为民造福精神  运用科学力量战胜非典型肺炎疫情”, Renmin Ribao, April 21, 2003.  Wang Shujun 王淑军: “No need to be afraid of SARS as long as one properly prevents and treats” “非典型肺炎 做好防治不足惧” , Renmin Ribao, April 4th, 2003.   Luo Chunhua 罗春华: “SARS will be subdued one day” “降服非典会有时”, Renmin Ribao, April 24, 2003.   Bai Jianfeng 白剑峰: “The Communist Party is at forefront – a front line report from the prevention and curing of SARS work at the Sino‐Japanese Friendship Hospital” “共产党
员冲在最前面—来自中日友好医院防治非典一线的报告”, Renmin Ribao, April 21, 2003.   Gong Wen 龚雯: “岂容借疫情发“黑心财” “How can we tolerate that the epidemic situation is used to make money in a sinister way”, Renmin Ribao, April 18, 2003. (Original text: “对破坏市场秩序的“黑心”经营者，依法处治，决不手软”)  Zhu Jianhong 朱剑红: “The National Committee of Development and Reform starts a special investigation into prices of medicines and related products” “国家发展和改革委
员会—开展非典药品和相关商品价格专项检查”, Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2003.  Zhang Xiaosong 张晓松: When buying and taking Chinese medicine, one should read the instruction in detail – do not readily place trust in “miracle drugs” for preventing SARS” “购买服用中药应细读说明书  莫轻信预防非典“特效药”, Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2003. 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Liu Taishan 刘泰山, Mao Haowen 冒浩文: “Handle with a cool head, make persistent efforts, fulfil assigned tasks, don’t shoulder too heavy tasks, Guangdong is in full force carrying out the SARS prevention and curing work” ”沉着应对  再接再厉  不辱使命  不负
重托 广东全力以赴做好非典型肺炎防治工作”, Renmin Ribao, April 19, 2003.   Xinhua in Renmin Ribao: “The State Council press office is carrying out a press conference – deputy minister of the standing committee of the Ministry of Health, Gao Qiang etc. answers journalist’s about the situation of preventing and curing SARS” “国务
院新闻办公室举行新闻发布会  卫生部常务副部长高强等就非典型肺炎防治情况答记者
问”, April 21, 2003.   Xinhua in Renmin Ribao: “In the midst of crisis, union is strength – people of the whole country are resisting SARS in a concerted effort – an on spot report” “危难中，我们众志
成城—全国人民齐心协力抗击非典纪实”, April 24, 2003. 
 
2008:  Ceng Huafeng 曾华锋, Zuo Ya 左娅: “Infants in Gansu got kidney stones from drinking baby formula – the Ministry of Health is highly suspecting contamination of baby formula – Sanlu Company is recalls parts of its baby formula” “甘肃婴儿喝奶粉患结石，
卫生部高度怀疑奶粉污染，三鹿公司召回部分奶粉”, Renmin Ribao, September 12, 2008.  Xinhua in Renmin Ribao: “It is preliminary assumed that unlawful elements have added melamine to raw milk – Beijing, Hubei and Hunan etc. has also received reports of instances” “初步认定不法分子在原奶中添加三聚氰胺 北京湖北湖南等地也接到病例
报告”, September 13, 2008.  Wang Junping 王君平: “Severely handling Sanlu baby formula case, the State council is activating the highest level of response for large national food safety accidents, establishing urgent small leadership group to deal with it and gives free rescue and curing for the sickened” “严肃处理三鹿婴幼儿奶粉事件 国务院启动国家重大食品安全
事故Ⅰ级响应 成立应急处置领导小组 对患病婴幼儿免费救治”, Renmin Ribao, September 14, 2008.  Zou Ya 左娅: “Publication of the results of a periodic special investigation for melamine in Sanlu's infant formula” “婴幼儿配方奶粉三聚氰胺专项检查阶段性检查结果公布”, Renmin Ribao, September 17, 2008.  Wang Junping 王君平: “The Ministry of Health is searching at maximum scale for infants that have consumed Sanlu’s baby formula” “卫生部 ‐ 最大限度搜索服用三鹿问题奶粉患
儿”, Renmin Ribao, September 17.   Renmin Ribao: “The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is answering journalist’s questions about the Sanlu case” “就三鹿奶粉有关问题 外交部发言人答记
者问”, September 17, 2008. 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Feng Hua 冯华: “Safe milk needs to be protected systematically – interview with Liu Chengguo, director of China Dairy Industry Association” “放心奶需要机制保障—访中国
奶业协会理事长刘成果”, Renmin Ribao, September 21, 2008.   Wang Bixue 王比学: “Who will recall unsafe products” “谁来召回不安全食品”, Renmin Ribao, September 17, 2008.  Xinhua in Renmin Ribao: “Wen Jiabao leads an executive meeting at the State Council, decides to fully monitor dairy products, and reorganise the dairy industry” “温家宝主持
召开国务院常务会议，决定全面检查奶制品，整顿奶制品行业”, September 18, 2008.   Su Xianlong 苏显龙: “After the cancellation of the selection of China Famous Brand” “名
牌评选取消之后”, Renmin Ribao, September 23, 2008.   Shi Guosheng 石国胜: “How to inspect when not “exempted from inspection”” “不“免检”
如何检?”, Renmin Ribao, September 24, 2008.   Luo Guojun 骆国骏: “Hebei – the responsible for the Sanlu case are dealt with according to Party protocol” “河北 – “三鹿奶粉事故”有关责任人受到组织处理”, Renmin Ribao, September 17, 2008.  Wang Fangjie 王方杰: “Sanlu Group’s chairwoman and general manager, Tian Wenhua, is put under criminal detention” “三鹿集团原董事长总经理田文华被刑事拘留”, Renmin Ribao, September 18, 2008.  Peng Bo 彭波: “Another 12 criminal suspects in Hebei are caught” “河北又有十二名犯罪
嫌疑人落网”, Renmin Ribao, September 19, 2008.  Wu Yan 吴焰: “Respect the popular will’s request for accountability” “尊重民意的问责“, Renmin Ribao, September 24, 2008.  Wang Minghao 王明浩: “The spokesperson of Shijiazhuang City government – on why the Sanlu baby formula case was delayed” “石家庄市政府新闻发言人—三鹿奶粉事件为
何迟报”, Renmin Ribao, October 1, 2008.   Li Bin 李斌, Huang Jinquan 黄全权: “We shall be responsible to the people – Wen Jiabao visits children ill from the “Sanlu milk formula case” in Beijing and inspects dairy product markets” “我们要对人民负责—温家宝在北京看望“奶粉事件”患病儿童并考察
奶制品市场”, Renmin Ribao September 22, 2008.  Jiang Hongbing 姜泓冰: “Scientific development is of utmost urgency” “科学发展迫在眉
睫”, Renmin Ribao, September 22, 2008.   Li Shijia 李诗佳, Wang Jiangang 王建刚: “Wen Jiabao had an informal talk with the leaders of local Chinese language media in America” “温家宝与美当地华文媒体负责人座
谈”, Renmin Ribao, September 26, 2008. 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Nanfang Zhoumo 
 
2003:  Chen Min 陈海, Jiang Hua 江华: “Guangzhou is struggling against an unknown virus” “广
州抗击不明病毒”, Nanfang Zhoumo February 13, 2003.  Wu Zhanguang 吴展光: “Interview with an expert at Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention – how to handle a huge, suddenly emerging public health crisis?” “国家
疾病预防控制中心专家访谈 重大突发公共卫生事件如何处理?”, Nanfang Zhoumo, February 13, 2003.  Li Yiyan 李一言: “Fear stops with openness” “恐慌止于公开”, Nanfang Zhoumo, February 13, 2003.  Li Hujun 李虎军, Guo Guangdong 郭光东: “What do we lean on to win over SARS?” “我们
靠什么战胜”非典”?”, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003.  Lu Rong 卢嵘, Du Junxiao 杜峻晓: “Ningxia is trying to block “SARS”” “宁夏追堵”非典””, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003.  Wu Zhanguang 吴展光, Zheng Yigong (Shanxi Financial Daily) 郑亦工 (山西经济日报记
者): “Xing county in Shanxi – a record from a poor county’s SARS struggle” “山西兴县 一
个贫困县的抗非典纪录”, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003.  Liu Hongbo 刘洪波: “The “atypical” case of Haicheng” “海城的”非典型事件””, Nanfang Zhoumo, April 24, 2003.  
2008:  Yang Xiaohui 杨小卉: ”How to monitor the safety of food products” “安全食品的监管之
道”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 18, 2008.  Xiao Xun 笑蜀: “Countless public relations show the degeneration of media” “无量公关
凸显媒体病变”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 18, 2008.  Su Yongtong 苏永通, Ma Changbo 马昌博: “Li Zhangjiang resigns, one more step forward” “李长江辞职，下一步……”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 25, 2008.  Nanfang Zhoumo: “A well run government should not have storms of accountability” “善
治政府不该有问责风暴”, September 25, 2008.  Su Yongtong, 苏永通, Xue Tian 薛田: “Three controversial aspects of the selection of “China famous brand”” ““中国名牌”评选三大争议”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 25, 2008. 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Su Yongtong, 苏永通, Xue Tian 薛田: “How to deal with quality problems of Famous brand products”“名牌展品出现质量问题怎么办”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 25, 2008.  Ding Bu Zhi 丁补之, Zhao Lei 赵蕾, Wu Yao 吴瑶: “ “The tainted baby milk formula case calls for a compensation package” “毒奶粉事件呼唤一揽子赔偿方案”, Nanfang Zhoumo, September 2, 2008.  He Feng 禾风, Jia Siyu 贾思玉: “Chinese milk industry: From eight golden years to a complete mess” ”中国奶业: 黄金八年, 一地鸡毛”, Nanfang Zhoumo, October 9, 2008.  Xu Nan 徐楠: “Revisiting a chaotic scene: ‘milk blenders’, connections and stupid cows” “乱象回溯: “调奶人”, “关系奶”和“傻子牛””, Nanfang Zhoumo, October 9, 2008.   Zhang Jun Xiu 张俊修, Meng Deng Ke 孟登科, Wang Xia 王霞: “The government should not make supervising units into “moneymaking sons” “政府部门不能把检测单位变成收
钱的”儿子””, Nanfang Zhoumo, October 9, 2008.   
 
